Články, které napsal Radovan Fišer

Radovan Fišer: Student IES od roku 2005.

Credit default swaps in the 2008 Financial crisis

19. 5. 2009

In media, CDS are reflected in a harsh way. The only adjectives characterizing them are timebomb, crisis, Chernobyl, Gamble, Ponzi and of course collapse. But is that true?

Introduction to Financial Derivatives and particularly CDS

Derivatives are mainly used for risk management (hedging), speculation and arbitrage. Tradable derivatives are traded on derivatives exchanges, for example on Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Eurex and NYSE Euronext Liffe, where the latter two are electronic platforms.

A CDS is an OTC (unregulated) contract based on a financial instrument. Its buyer pays the seller periodic payments whereas the seller pays buyer a specified amount, if and only if the flow of cash from the underlying instrument to the buyer of the CDS changes in a specified way. To give an example, imagine an investor who buyed a bond and is supposed to receive periodical coupons. Eventually, to hedge the cash flow, she can buy a CDS contract from Safety Inc. specified in this way: I will pay Safety Inc. periodic payments (% of my expected total cash flow) and Safety Inc. will pay me the expected total cash flow if the bond defaults.

Holders of bonds are generally exposed to credit risk. A CDS serves as insurance against counterparty’s default. A CDS represents a mean of transferring and reduction of credit risk. From regulatory point of view, the value of an insured asset rises, but to an extent limited by the credibility of the CDS issuer. To realize loss having a CDS, another thing must happen: it is the default of the seller of the CDS.

The difference of CDS to traditional insurance is that the buyer of a CDS does not have to own the underlying instrument. To give an analogy, if this was a feature of standard insurance, one could insure himself against the robbery of his neighbour’s house. It looks like a bet and it actually is a bet. This fact reflects the schizophrenia of derivatives: they are both hedging and speculative tools. Another difference is that contrary to CDS issuers, traditional insurance companies have to meet required reserves and are closely monitored by public authorities. On the CDS market, no reserves are required from the sellers of protection.[2] Then there is the issue of correlation which must be limited in portfolios of both traditional and CDS insurers.

The spread of CDS offers a valuable piece of information: it reflects investors’ opinion on a company financial health. Since CDS can be later traded, they incorporate market’s opinion on the company. It touches the idea behind CDS: market is supposed to price the risk best.

In his article,[3] David Paul mentions that the fact that credit derivatives contracts are difficult to track on corporate financial statements. Therefore, a party can never be sure about the true level of counterparty’s exposure to credit derivatives risk.

In his series of articles on FinancialSense.com, Daniel Amerman presents an example of estimation of profitability of a CDS contract which I replicate here:

Table: Profitability of a CDS contract.

Example on profit from selling a CDS
Guarantee on $10 000 000
Assumptions    Cash Flow
% fee 5%
Absolute fee $500 000
Size of loss 50%
Probability of loss 5%
Expected loss $250 000
Expected profit $250 000

A CDS underwriter takes on A guarantee on a $10mil loan for 5%. In its calculations, it assumes a 5% chance that 50% of the loan will default. All in all, the $10mil guarantee assures him $250 000 profit which makes 2.5% return.

CDS prices do not reflect only the credit risk of the underlying debtor.There are situations when even healthy businesses struggle to stand against their liabilities. For a bank to get into serious troubles, a short period of illiquidity on short-term credit market is enough. Recession, a system risk, is a threat for everyone. The relation of financial sector to system risk is specific. It faces more system risk than other sectors. It is thanks to the high degree of interconnection of players in financial markets and thanks to the character of the business and its regulation. For example, if an unexpected number of CDS calls accumulates, issuers’ balance sheets may found it too difficult to absorb the calls.

An insurer can insure himself too, by a CDS. Then, a chain of safety links is created. However, if an element of the chain fails, then a chain reaction comes. The chain may be complicated; according to a Wall Street partner cited in Time’s article,[4] „an original CDS can go through 15 or 20 trades, so that when a default occurs, the so-called insured party or hedged party doesn’t know who’s responsible for making up the default and if that end player has the resources to cure the default." In the same article, however, another partner dismisses this risk by saying that “contractual law requires both parties to inform and get approval”. Nevertheless, “the CDS market is unregulated, does not have a standard contract, no standard capital requirements, and no standard way of valuating securities in these transactions”, says another partner in the article. Summing this up, we see an indicia that the market is simply not correctly specified, put in words of mathematics.

There have been attempts of switching CDS market to an organised market with a global clearing-house. However, stigma of the OTC CDS market would be felt at least for 5 years further on since the bulk of contracts have been made at 5-year maturity.[5] To be concrete, a particular attempt to set up a CDS exchange has already failed in 2007, when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange created a federally regulated exchange-based market for CDS. So far, it hasn’t worked because it has been boycotted by banks, who prefer private trading.[6]

However, recently (November 2008), major US dealers led by Morgan Stanley turned in their opinion and now back several key proposals: clearing of CDS, margin rules, Federal Reserve’s oversight of dealers and large market participants, and SEC jurisdiction over anti-fraud and market manipulation activities. They still oppose trading CDSs on exchanges.

Financial Crisis[7]

The point where CDSs enter the story came when issuers of MBS started to use them as credit enhancement. Eventually, CDS replaced insurance bonds in the role of leading insurance instrument.

Lasting growth of demand for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) pressed interest on them down, closer to risk free rate. Therefore, their issuers demanded as cheap insurance as possible. In face of inherent risk in MBS, traditional investors and debt insuring agencies could not sustain price competition with CDS. The result was that traditional investors exited the MBS insurance market and left CDS as the only insurance instrument for subordinate tranches of MBS.[8] It seems that CDS issuers felt the risk in MBS differently.

Figure: Subprime Mortgage Delinquency Rate. Source: Arthur D. Little.
Deriv

In 2000, there had been $130 billion in subprime mortgage lending, with $55 billion of that repackaged as mortgage bonds. But in 2005, there was $625 billion in subprime mortgage loans, $507 billion of which found its way into mortgage bonds.[9]

The break in optimistic development in mortgages and MBS came in 2006 when prices of real estate in US peaked and ultimately took downward sloping path (see following figure), when ARM’s rates reacted to rising interest rates by an increase and when lending standards tightened.

Figure: S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index from 1988 to 2008Q3. Bold line represents percentage change of the index compared to its value a year ago. It peakes in 2006 and in 2008Q3 it reaches value -17%. Source: S&P.
Deriv

Then, financing of mortages became more expensive and defaults on them appeared.

Figure: U.S. Residential real estate loan charge-off rates (%), house prices and lending standards. Source: Global Financial Stability Report October 2008 by IMF, pg. 13.
deriv

Let me note that a significant part of mortgages in US are non-recourse mortgages. When defaulting on such a mortgage, one is not personally responsible for the rest of payments. Therefore, the lender takes only the collateral (a house) but not a car, for example. The feature if non-recourse mortgages is that falling housing prices are a rational incentive for people to default on mortgages. It occurs when price of house falls even below the value of the mortgage.

First defaults on MBS appeared and their price begin to fall.

Figure: Prices of U.S. Mortgage-Related Securities, in US dollars. Source: Global Financial Stability Report October 2008 by IMF, pg. 13.
Deriv

The effect spread all over the economy. MBS served as the mostly used collateral in collareralized debt obligations (CDO). Often, they were insured by CDS.

Credit Default Swaps and Financial Crisis

In October 2008, CDS notional outstanding value was about $55,000bn.[10] After factoring out offsetting positions, the number is about 2% of original value, $1,000bn. Most of this amount is somehow collateralised.[11] (Pickel, 2008)

CDS written on mortgage backed securities (MBS) rolled over AIG’s and others’ balance sheets like thunderball in September 2008. Contrary to corporate and municipal CDS, CDS written on structured finance embody several risky features. In case of a correlated event (a systemic crisis, a recession or a speculation-driven fall of some companies shares’), they tend to attack its issuers’ balance sheet in herd. The subprime part of CDS has increased probability of a systemic event.[12] Recently, it was shown that the MBS part of CDS has plagued balance sheets of many important financial institutions and significantly added to reasons why several of them filled for bankcruptcy. Clearly, in case of MBS, CDS were a wrong bet.

From todays point of view, American sub-prime MBS have been in fact an uninsurable asset. We may guess that some years back, the CDS issuers were biased by collective optimistic upheavel in MBS market. Because of the rapidly growing demand, they might not have had the time to properly evaluate risk which they were taking on their balance sheets, by issuing these CDS. We might think that if they did, spreads on MBS would soar, placing a limit on MBS’ underwriters. However, this was difficult to be done because market was not only optimistic but even ecstatic about MBS. I have to mention rating agencies who are supposed to give a conservative risk-assessment. All of them, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch failed.

Finally, in my opinion, we ended up in the situation when issuers of CDS written on subprime and increasingly also on prime MBS could only pray for a miracle. The miracle was that the whole segment does not experience a serious problem. Otherwise, the issuers would not have money to cover accumulated losses.

Let’s think about the fact that many people have been talking about the real estate bubble burst for years. One of these, Paul Johnson, a successful hedge-fund manager, has been shorting MBS for years and today he is a hero. Let’s see the fact that there is a reasonable possibility that a large portion of CDS written on MBS securities will be exercised.

Table: Profitability of CDS contracts, revised.

Example on profit from selling a CDS
Guarantee on $10 000 000
Assumptions nbsp;nbsp; Cash Flow
% fee 5%
Absolute fee $500 000
Size of loss 50%
Probability of loss 20%
Expected loss $1 000 000
Expected profit -$500 000
Amount of contracts 750
Payables $750 000 000
Profit -$375 000 000

Several years ago, when current CDS were originating, issuers were thinking in a different way.

Let’s take an some real world examples.

David Paul (2008) describes the case of AIG. With the decline of real estate market, it was obliged to write off its books a part of its MBS portfolio. Worsening of its financial strength (amount of assets) led Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s to downgrading it from AAA to the single-A level. Now let’s note that some of AIG’s CDS contracts stated that if AIG suffers a downgrade, it is obliged to post collateral equal to a percentage of the notional amount of the CDS. Paul (2008) notes that the amount of the collateral that AIG had to send, given the estimated $450bn of CDS contracts, was close to $100bn. It AIG failed to send the collateral, CDS against AIG would become due and other parties would receive settlement calls. In reality, AIG was taken over by the US Government which warded the calls off.

Daniel Amerman argues that bankruptcy of Freddie Mae and Fannie Mac would trigger settlement of $1,0bn of CDS. Their issuers would not be able to meet their obligations which would trigger another round of CDS settlements which would also fail.[13]

Opinions on what to do with the CDS on MBS differ. Some people support bail-outs and borrowing cheap money from FED. Others prefer bankruptcy model and a form of settling CDS at discount, forced by the US Congress.[14] Third group claims that CDS are generally not a problem, claiming that the cataclysmic chain of counterparty failures in CDS settlements is an unrealistic fear.[15]

Conclusion. Are CDS bad? Can we make them better?

One must ask, is there a difference between traditional bond insurance and newly used CDS? The answer is no. In both cases, market players do what they think is best. They (are) insure(d) for a premium.

CDS are a tool which is not bad per se. What led to their misuse was people’s leniency towards risk embedded in CDS written on MBS. The problem originated roughly five years ago when the popularity of MBS touched the sky. They were regarded as safe as T-bills but with much higher yield. The market of MBS was very profitable and everybody wanted to join it. Unfortunately, this optimistic frame systemically infected risk managers‘ minds. The managers started to default on their attention to risks that not even triple A MBS never stopped to bear: they were standing on sub-prime mortgages and non-recourse prime mortgages, which were sold in unnaturally quickly rising housing market fertilized by cheap credit.

Is there a way how to emphasize risk in future? Is there a way how to make agents avoid in fact investing in assets that, as we see now, were doomed in advance?

First note that companies which are too-big-to-fail will always have a reasonable incentive to make bets which others cannot afford. Second, note that the principle-agent problem poses a difficult problem in joint-stock companies: those whose money are in can never be sure what the company is actually doing.

Some say that in the competitive race towards profit, driven by positive expectations, risk considerations are inevitably left behind, as well as those who do not participate in the race. Probably, it is shareholders‘ interest to enforce long-run view on companies’s strategy, at the expense of short-run motivation of senior management. Clearly, primarily, it should be the risk management department, separated from senior management by kind of a Chinese wall, that should properly manage a company’s risks. However, the risk management department could be changed. It or its part could serve as a special watchdog of shareholders, working on their behalf and ordered by them. Thus, shareholders would get new information that could change their decisions from those made under current state of institutions.

Another step is in making markets more complete. Then we could reduce the chance of occurence of surprises like AIG’s insolvency. Providing more information should enable agents reach higher level of rationality. There are already some proposals, already mentioned. The clearing house is supposed to eliminate possible deadly chain of defaults on CDS payments. Margin rules eliminate credit risk in counterparties. Fed’s and SEC’s oversight should assure smooth functioning of CDS markets. Dealers of CDS agree and oppose only to the proposal of exchange trading.[16]

In my opinion, the mistake is in people. As the best solution how to avoid future financial crisis amplified by CDS, I see improved mediation of shareholders long-run interest on companies’ strategy and in pouring more information into markets.


[1] Initially, CDS payments on Lehman’s debt were estimated to reach between $100bn and $400bn. Finally, they reached only $5.2bn due to offsetting, for example.

[2] It is possible that counterparties negotiate some forms of marking-to-rating, required reserves or conditional sending of collateral. A Reuters report says that „the standard practice in the CDS market is that hedge funds and other counterparties must adjust collateral on a daily basis as the value of a contract changes“. Source: Reuters, http://tinyurl.com/659b5j .

[3] Paul, D. (11. 10. 2008). Credit Default Swaps, the Collapse of AIG and Addressing the Crisis of Confidence. Read in The Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-paul/credit-default-swaps-the_b_133891.html.

[4] Morrissey, J. (17. 04 2008). Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis? Read in Time: http://tinyurl.com/48ufdq.

[5] Coudert, V. (13. 10. 2008). Stormy Weather in the Credit Default Swap Market. Read in http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2420.

[6] Engdahl, W. (28. 06 2008). Credit default swaps: the next crisis. Read in the Financial sense: http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/engdahl/2008/0606.html.

[7] The limit on word count made me include an appendix concerning the development of the financial crisis.

[8] Little, A. D. (2008). Demystifying the Credit Crunch.

[9] Lewis, M. (01. 12 2008). The End. Read in The Portfolio: http://tinyurl.com/5s5w2b.

[10] $55,000bn = $55,000,000,000,000 = $55 trillion.

[11] Pickel, R. (30. 10. 2008). Is it really fair to cast CDS sector as the central villain? Read in Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31c1e67e-a622-11dd-9d26-000077b07658.html.

[12] Let me cite an example by Michael Lewis in his article on Portfolio.com which clearly describes probability that a mortage upon which a CDS MBS is (also) written, will default : „In Bakersfield, California, a Mexican strawberry picker with an income of $14,000 and no English was lent every penny he needed to buy a house for $720,000.“ Source: http://tinyurl.com/5s5w2b .

[13] Amerman, D. (08. 10 2008). The Hidden Bailout Of $1.4 Trillion In Fannie / Freddie Credit-Default Swaps. Read in Financial Sense: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/amerman/2008/0910.html

[14] I mean writers at the website Institutional Risk Analytics, www.institutionalriskanalytics.com.

[15] They mention that AIG proves this point because it was the only company with AAA rating and as such, it did not need to put aside collateral on CDS contracts. When downgraded, they suddendly needed to send a bold bunch of money. Otherwise, it is being said, companies use marking-to-market wildly.

[16] Reuters: CDS exchange trading not the only solution. Source: http://tinyurl.com/6ypyly.

This essay was written for Banking in December 2008 at IES FSV UK.

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Distortions in Company Taxation in the EU

One of the ideal features of single market is that national tax structures do not affect behaviour of economic agents. Unfortunately, this is not the case of a group of 27 economies in the EU. Under an extreme interpretation of the Treaty of the EU and its provisions about free movement of capital, it would be impossible to keep separate tax systems. Nonetheless, the general view allows for separate tax systems as long as they manage to avoid double-taxation and to tax all firms in the source country in the same way. (Griffith, pg. 21) However, sometimes they do not manage it: the judgements of the European Court of Justice have already changed national tax policies in several issues of unfair tax treatment. (OECD 1, pg. 4)

Broadly speaking the European Commission (EC) does not intend to harmonise tax systems across the EU.[1] It is so because differences between tax systems are not a problem as such. The real difficulties arise from incompatibilities which lead to the organizational problems. (EC Tax 4)

Corporate income tax (CIT) rates are not bound by any rules. Capital, contrary to labour, is much more internationally mobile, and governments naturally try both to lure it to their domiciles and not to scare away the existing capital. Eventually, they have engaged in competition for capital in the form of offering state aid and tax incentives for foreign direct investors. The decision of firms where to locate their business then might be determined by differences in tax rates rather than differences in efficiency of production. In terms of economic criteria this leads to inefficient levels of production within the EU. (Swann, pg. 70)

By now, we have established two areas with a kind of distortions. We will look at them closely. Let’s review development in taxes in general first.

EU induced distortions

Let‘s sum up briefly the main tax-related companies‘ obstacles to cross-border business. Note that they often stand against the Treaty of the EU. (EU tax 2, pg. 223-305).

  • In many areas, double taxation occurs as a result of conflicting taxing rights.
  • Member States are reluctant to allow tax relief for losses incurred by associated companies whose profits fall outside the scope of their taxing rights.
  • Principle of separate accounting requires costly transfer pricing (definition in Appendix).

As a long-run strategy to tackle these issues, the EC proposed to provide companies with a common consolidated tax base for their EU-wide activities. Four different solutions were proposed:

  • Home State Taxation scheme for small and medium sized enterprises,
  • Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB),
  • European Union Corporate Income Tax and
  • Compulsory Harmonized EU Tax Base.

The EC is currently working on the first two projects. (EC tax 1) The draft legislative proposal for CCCTB was supposed to come out in Autumn 2008, but has been delayed. (ITR 1)

CCCTB, contrarily to the currently active principle of separate accounting, is based on the notion that a group of companies form an economic unit which forms its single consolidated tax base across all states in which it is active according to harmonised rules. The tax base is then apportioned between the different Member states according to a formula, which has not been yet specified.[2] (Spengel, pg. 9)

CCCTB is supposed to eliminate the main tax obstacles to cross-border business activity, for taxation would no longer be based on the principle of separate accounting. Put in the words of the EC, „the offsetting of profits and losses would be immediate, obstacles to corporate reorganisations would be virtually eliminated, domestic investment would no longer receive preferential tax treatment, and the administrative costs would be sharply reduced, as would the risks of double taxation.“ (Aujean, pg. 30)

The group of CCCTB opposing states (e. g., Britain, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia) is led by Ireland. (ITR 2) Let’s name their main arguments. (Dodwell).

  • Countries can end up with smaller tax revenue.
    • An example is the UK with tax base wider than in other EU countries (see Table 1 which illustrates the importance of the breadth of tax base).
  • The apportioning formula embeds preferential treatment to large countries. The biggest controversy spreads around the sales criterion. The EC prefers to measure sales at destination over origin. This method prefers large countries with larger consumption over small countries.[3]
  • CCCTB requires a common specification of tax (consider variability of allowances and incentives).
    • Since tax collection is based on tax base, some people see this as a step towards currently controversial tax harmonisation. Note that even the public relations side of the argument is important.
    • Governments would lose a fiscal policy tool (the depreciation allowances) which stimulate investment. (RGE)
  • Possible optionality of CCCTB would impose administrative burden on states by the need to run two tax systems. Some people speak about limited rationality of optional CCCTB (see footnote #4).

Let’s note that tax issues in the EU are legally processed under consultation procedure, i. e., the decision lies in the hands of the Council of the EU whose decision has to be unanimous. (Wikipedia) However, the EC plans to push CCCTB through via the principle of enhanced cooperation, making it an optional scheme.[4]

Table 1: High tax rates don’t necessarily mean a high tax take (1999-2003)

  Tax rate Tax revenue to GDP
Germany 39% 1.3%
France 34% 2.9%
UK 30% 3.3%

Source: Dodwell

Let’s describe now the competition for mobile capital in the EU. According to the paper I use as a major source, it is small countries who are the leaders of the competition. The small countries stance towards CCCTB has already been described. They argue that CCCTB will eliminate the advantages offered by their business environment in favour of bigger states. For example, the EU opposing think tanks in the Czech Republic emphasize that CCCTB significantly eliminates tax competition.[5]

Tax competition

Tax competition has traditionally been considered by economists as welfare-lowering. The major argument against tax competition has been that it leads to inefficient allocation of productive resources and mainly public services. However, eventually a shift in standard model occurred and governmental use of resources stopped to be considered as strictly efficient. Instead, it might be better to „tame the Leviathan“ a.k.a. Government, i. e., reduce the resources used in an inefficient manner. (Douglas, pg. 1). Let me sum up main problems associated with tax competition (also called „the race-to-the-bottom in capital tax rates“).[6] (Eurostat 1, pg. 87):

  • Eurostat confirmed that tax competition eventually leads to the shift of tax burden on less mobile (less elastic) factors like labour, consumption and real estate. (Hoek, pg. 27). As the reasons of this change in tax-mix, Eurostat names increased capital mobility and the accession to the EU of a group of low-tax countries. (Eurostat 1, pg. 11)
  • Given that capital is, as a rule, both more lightly taxed than labour income and often taxed at flat rates, equity considerations warn that progressivity of the income tax may even diminish for individual holders of capital.
  • Tax competition may eventually lead to the evaporation of CIT. Then all arguments for the existence of CIT may be applied. The main reason why to keep CIT is that it plays an important withholding function because it reduces the tax-induced incentives for businesses to incorporate and to shift from highly-taxed labour income into lower-taxed capital income (so called backstop function of CIT to personal income tax).
  • Tax competition gives rise to political frictions. Net payers to the EU budget say they „finances unfair tax competition against itself and face tax dumping.“ (Barysch)

Chatelais (pg. 6) shows that small countries[7] initiated a very significant tax-cutting process which intensified after year 2000 (see following figure). Big countries reacted only moderately. Why? Chatelais (pg. 3) say that the ratio of the capital transfer and GDP in case of small countries is high enough to „largely offset the initial loss of tax revenues“.

Daň

Source: Chatelais (pg. 6) using OECD, EC.

In the econometric estimation of their model of tax competition in Europe, Chatelais found presence of strategic interactions which are motivated by the importance of foreign capital.

They show that countries observe their neighbours tax rates and respond with their tax rate the following year and more than proportionally. Looking more deeply, they found that countries react strongly to neighbours’s behaviour and that distant countries react to core countries (Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) behaviour by sharper changes in order to compensate for the missing agglomeration effects. In the group of small countries, only those close to the center play a significant role in corporate tax rate setting of large countries. Finally, Chatelais found that it is Ireland and Belgium who can be considered as individual leaders for major countries.

Conclusion

As was the already solved monetary question, tax field is pain in back of the EU’s economic integration. In my opinion, the tax-task is very difficult. I think we all are prisoners who have a dilemma. We all have by far imperfect information about pay-offs of harmonised tax policy, some of us doubt good intentions of big players like France and we are reluctant to lose evem a penny of tax revenue and FDI. The way towards social optimum of a group of prisoners is seriously difficult. Compared to euro, we are getting on thin ice because we manipulate with (clearly visible) flows of money. That moves this policy issue to a much higher level: the political one. And finally, the issue represents a giant step in the integration of the EU.

The topic of CCCTB has regrettably been virtually untouched in the Czech media but I think it is a time-bomb of public discontent. Especially in the Czech Republic.

Personally, I am happy about the positives of CCCTB and I believe them. On the other hand, I do not know how big they are. I also do not know what is the cost of running and getting to run CCCTB. And I am afraid that no one will ever know this. Maybe it is the reason why I would prefer to go the way of evolution rather than revolution of the tax system.

I am happy about the fact that tax competition exists because I think lowering tax rates is a fundamentally good thing. Yes, the discontent of large countries is understandable because we all are greedy. And it is equally understandable that small countries will fight to keep their current rights. I think they understand CCCTB as an effort of large countries to actually steal their money. If the stance that large countries like France and Germany want to actually rob smaller countries becomes widely held, CCCTB may significantly decrease popularity of the EU.

I am curious whether the next generation will advance in the stance towards the EU integration. Whether the people will ever really want to integrate… Well, let’s leave the field of cheap talk… It all depends on money. Give us the money (advantages of the integration) and we will happily integrate.

Appendix

What is transfer pricing?

A definition (EU tax 2): Affiliated companies conducting cross-border business must behave on strictly market principles, i.e. act as if the business was being conducted between independent parties. The charged price–the transfer price–therefore has to be in accordance with the so-called arm’s length principle („I don‘t know you, my brother.“). The basis for the arm’s length principle is the separate entity approach; i.e. each affiliated company in a group is for tax purposes treated as a separate entity and taxed individually. For the Internal Market this means that a company has to provide separate accounting for every Member State where it is active.

What are recent trends in taxation in Europe?

The European Union is a high-tax area. In 2006, the overall collected tax (tax and social contributions) in the EU-27 amounted to 39.9 % of GDP, 12 percentage points above United States and Japan. CIT rates have been falling since the second half of the 1990 and they vary substantially within the Union, rising from 10 % (in Bulgaria and Cyprus) linearly to 35 % in Malta. (Eurostat 2, pgs. 3, 8)

In order to compensate for revenue lost through reduced CIT rates, most countries have broadened their CIT base by implementing less generous tax depreciation allowances and by eliminating special tax deductions and provisions. The average effective CIT rates have nonetheless declined over time across the OECD. From 1982 to 2004, tax revenue from CIT as a share of GDP decreased only in Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany. (OECD 1)

Daň

Source: Eurostat 2, pg. 9.

References

  1. (Swann) Dennis Swann. "Single European Market Beyond," Routledge, 2002.
  2. (Hoek) M. Peter van der Hoek, 2003. "Tax Harmonization and Competition in the European Union," Taxation eJournal of Tax Research , ATAX, University of New South Wales. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nsw/discus/52.html>.
  3. (Chatelais) Nicolas Chatelais & Mathilde Peyrat, 2008. "Are small countries leaders of the European tax competition ?," Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/cesdoc/bla08058.html>.
  4. (Spengel) Christoph Spengel & Carsten Wendt, 2007. "A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Multinational Companies in the European Union, Some Issues und Options," Working Papers 0717, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/btx/wpaper/0717.html>.
  5. (Griffith) Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2004. "What has been the tax competition experience of the past 20 years?," IFS Working Papers W04/05, Institute for Fiscal Studies. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ifs/ifsewp/04-05.html>.
  6. (EC Tax 1) European Commision’s website on taxation, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/index_en.htm>.
  7. (EC Tax 2) Company Taxation in the Internal Market; European Commision Staff Working Paper, SEC(2001)1681, 23.10.2001. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/company_tax_study_en.pdf>.
  8. (EC Tax 3) Communication of the Commision COM(2006): Co-ordinating Member States’ direct tax systems in the Internal Market. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/COM(2006)823_en.pdf>
  9. (EC Tax 4) FAQ on EC‘s position on taxation and qualified majority voting. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/conference/index_en.htm>
  10. (Eurostat 1) Taxation trends in the European Union 2008, full text. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm>
  11. (Eurostat 2) Taxation trends in the European Union 2008, main results. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm>
  12. (ITR 1) An article "European Union: European Commission’s proposal for CCCTB delayed"at the International Tax Review website. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/dagdnq>.
  13. (ITR 2) An article " CCCTB proposal date is in doubt" at the International Tax Review website. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/cq6ls8>.
  14. (OECD 1) OECD’s Policy Brief: Reforming Corporate Income Tax. July 2008. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/16/41069272.pdf>.
  15. (Barysch) Katinka Barysch, Is Tax Competition Bad?, in Centre for European Reform (CER) Bulletin issue 37, August/September 2004. Available at <http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/37_barysch.html>.
  16. (Douglas) Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June. Available at <http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v88y2004i6p1065-1091.html>
  17. (Aujean) Michel Aujean & Marie Pierre Hoo, "An outline of the CCCTB and some focal points". Available at <http://tinyurl.com/cj4bj4>
  18. (Dodwell) Bill Dodwell, "The CCCTB – is it a dream or a mirage?". In a newsletter of the Chartered Institute of Taxation, 2008. Available at <http://www.tax.org.uk/attach.pl/6688/7833/007_TA_0408.pdf>.
  19. (RGE) Daniela Schwarzer, "The downsides of harmonising the EU corporate tax base", 2008. Available at <http://tinyurl.com/c3bcql>.
  20. (Wikipedia) An article on Consultation procedure. Available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consultation_procedure>.

[1] There is one notable exception, written already in the Treaty of the EU. Different indirect tax rates would constitute an immediate barrier to the free movement of goods and services.

[2] The apportioning formula is used in the USA and Canada. The mechanism is that international firms use only one tax base defined by the EC (instead of more in case of separate accounting). The base is apportioned among the states where the firm operates according to the formula. Then each country applies its CIT rate. In the EU, a three-factor approach is currently suggested for the formula, based on labour (payroll and number of employees), tangible assets and sales. (EU tax 2, pg. 410; Dodwell)

[3] An excellent survey of the Irish arguments and current political support across the EU is provided by a study by Hume Brophy (2008) available at <http://www.humebrophy.com/news/publications/>. The position of the EC on the sales criterion is described in its working paper (2007) available at <http://tinyurl.com/dltah3>. The international experience with apportionment is described in a presentation from the UConn EC Tax Symposium (March 2008) available at <http://tinyurl.com/c7o9va>.

[4] The Chartered Institute of Accountants in Ireland argues that „if CCCTB were to work at all, all Member States would have to join the party“ (02/2009). Available at <http://tinyurl.com/dy86px>.

[5] EUportal <http://tinyurl.com/clbzcb> and The Liberal Institute <http://tinyurl.com/d3ln7z>.

[6] Note that in this essay I do not write about positive effects of tax competition (see Douglas for review of this difficult discussion).

[7] The division is based solely on area, not GDP.

This article is an essay on European Economic Policies, a course at IES FSV UK, submitted in April 2009.

Illustration taken without permission from Praise Be to Tax Competition! on Mises.org.

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Kořeny finanční krize polopatě

29. 3. 2009

Marta Nachtmannová, absolventka ISS FSV UK, v současné době v Dánsku, mě upozornila na animovanou vizualizaci vzniku finanční krize Crisis of Credit. Je to dílo vydařené nejen po estetické, ale i obsahové stránce. Jednoduše, slovem, obrázkem, textem a s příklady totiž vysvětluje, co se do médií začalo drát v létě 2008.

Na světlo se dostalo zjištění, že finanční svět podlehl kouzlu amerických hypoték. Následovaly ztráty účetní velkých finančních institucí a první státní intervence. V Americe pak naplno propukla ekonomická krize, která s sebou nakonec stáhla Evropu, která Českou republika nenechala stát opodál.

Vím ještě o jednom dobrém textu na téma kořenů finanční krize. Je jím PDF dokument Demystifying the Credit Crunch: A Primer and Glossary z dílny Private Equity Council. Dozvíte se v něm v podstatě to samé, co ve výše uvedeném videu, ale dostanete se až ke konkrétním pojmům, jako jsou, uvedeno zkratkami, CDO, ABS, MBS, subprime, SPV, ARM a tak podobně.

Nakonec uvedu ještě třetí odkaz, a to na článek Milana Zeleného, profesora ekonomie, World financial crisis has long roots, jehož hlavní zprávou je, že “It all started with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).” To zní podobně jako úvodní písnička (YouTube) populárního seriálu The Big Bang Theory: “It all started with a big BANG!”

CRA requires banks to offer credit throughout their entire market area and prohibits them from targeting only wealthier neighborhoods. In 1995, as a result of urging from President Bill Clinton, the CRA regulations were radically changed. The banks were forced to pressure their subsidiaries and non-CRA institutions into loosening their lending criteria and standards. The Clinton Revision further allowed the securitization of CRA loans containing subprime mortgages. This intentional loosening of underwriting standards was clearly a time bomb waiting to explode. (Milan Zelený)

Myslíte jako Milan Zelený, že právě CRA je Bang! finanční krize?

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